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In the present study EEG was recorded simultaneously while two participants were
playing the three-person ultimatum game (UG). Both participants received different offers
from changing proposers about how to split up a certain amount of money between the
three players. One of the participants had no say, whereas the other, the responder, was
able to harm the payoff of all other players. The aim of the study was to investigate how the
outcomes of the respective other are evaluated by participants who were treated fairly or
unfairly themselves and to what extent agency influences concerns for fairness. Analyses
were focused on the medial frontal negativity (MFN) as an early index for subjective value
assignment. Recipients with veto-power exhibited enhanced, more negative-going, MFN
amplitudes following proposals that comprised a low share for both recipients, suggesting
that responders favored offers with a fair amount to at least one of the two players.
Though, the powerless players cared about the amount assigned to the responder, MFN
amplitudes were larger following fair compared to unfair offers assigned to the responder.
Similarly, concerns for fairness which determined the amplitude of the MFN, suggested
that the powerless players exhibited negative and conversely the responders, positive
social preferences.
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INTRODUCTION
Comparative processes are essential to assess the emotional mean-
ing assigned to a given situation. Whether we perceive something
as pleasant or unpleasant depends on the alternatives and their
accessibility (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000). For example, a rewarding stim-
ulus might get devalued in situations associated with feelings of
anger or envy. Thus, the nature of emotions elicited by the recep-
tion, omission, or termination of reward or punishment depends
on what we expect and on what others receive in comparison to
oneself (Festinger, 1954; Rolls, 2005). This circumstance becomes
apparent when looking at recent findings in the field of neuroe-
conomics investigating how people evaluate specific situations
associated with reward or punishment in relation to significant
others using simple experimental games.
One [besides several others, for a review see, Rilling and Sanfey
(2011)] commonly used experimental game to study reward
related decision processes and the underlying neural substrates in
a social context is the ultimatum game (UG; Güth et al., 1982). In
its original version a proposer is endowed with a sum of money
he/she has to share with a responder. He/She can send any positive
amount to the responder, who in turn has the possibility to reject
or accept the proposed division of money. If the proposed distri-
bution is accepted by the responder, the money will be allocated
accordingly. Otherwise, if rejected by the responder, both receive
nothing. The proposer canmake only one proposal, all players are
anonymous to each other, and the game ends after the responder
has made his/her decision. Of course, the aim of each player in
this bargaining game is to maximize his/her share of the money.
Nevertheless, most responders are willing to abandon their divi-
sion if it is smaller than 20% of the total amount and proposers
offer about 40–50% of the total amount (Güth et al., 1982; Thaler,
1988; Güth and Van Damme, 1998). Though behavior in this
game seems to be rather irrational, results are very robust and do
not markedly change with the size of the stake (Slonim and Roth,
1998; Cameron, 1999; Munier and Costin, 2002). Even demo-
graphic variables, intellectual abilities, and socio-economic status
do not modulate behavior in this game (Güth et al., 2007; Nguyen
et al., 2011).
There are several regions in the brain that are implicated in the
representation of the subjective value of reward and punishment
[for reviews see Schultz (2006); Grabenhorst and Rolls (2011)].
One of these, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and in par-
ticular its dorsal part, might be of particular importance in the
comparative processes discussed above. In comparison with other
areas associated with the representation of reward, the ACC inte-
grates various aspects of a decision, e.g., probability, payoff, and
effort (Kennerley et al., 2009, 2011). Furthermore, the ACC eval-
uates not only values of alternatives during choice but also the
consequences of choices made. For this, the ACC receives input
from different neuronal sources associated with certain qualities
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of a reward and has strong connections to motor areas (e.g., Vogt
et al., 1992). All of these are requirements needed to synthesize
these various aspects of a given situation and to adapt preferences
in the light of the current goal and the effort that has to be taken.
However, this region is not necessarily related to actual decision
behavior (Seo and Lee, 2007; Luk andWallis, 2009).
Hence, it is not surprising that activation in the dorsal part
of the ACC (dACC) is consistently reported in neuroimaging
studies investigating decision processes in the UG (Sanfey et al.,
2003; Gospic et al., 2011; Kirk et al., 2011); irrespective of par-
ticipants’ age (Guroglu et al., 2011). Further evidence for the
involvement of the dACC in the context of the UG is provided
by electrophysiological studies.
The medial frontal negativity (MFN), an event related poten-
tial which is supposed to be generated in the dACC (Gehring and
Willoughby, 2002; Luu et al., 2003; Wessel et al., 2012), can be
observed after the receipt of negative compared to positive feed-
back (Miltner et al., 1997; Luu et al., 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2004b), after events that deviate from what we expect (Potts et al.,
2006; Hajcak et al., 2007; Pfabigan et al., 2011), and in response
to losses compared to gains (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002),
irrespective of whether an action or choice preceded (Donkers
et al., 2005; Martin et al., 2009). Furthermore, a similar negative
deflection can be reported when we observe someone else receiv-
ing negative feedback or losing money (Fukushima and Hiraki,
2009). Generally, it is assumed that the MFN discriminates events
on an abstract good-bad dimension (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004a;
Hajcak et al., 2006) or whether a goal has been achieved or not
(Holroyd et al., 2006). Given that the MFN can be observed
already 250ms after the onset of an event, it serves as an index
for early evaluation processes in economic decision making.
Having in mind that for some individuals the subjective value
assigned to a certain reward highly depends on what others
receive, the MFN should as well be modulated by social prefer-
ences like inequality aversion, altruism, or reciprocity. This has
been confirmed in parts by studies investigating the UG. Fair
offers elicited more positive MFN amplitudes than did unfair
offers and are therefore preferred in view of the assumptions on
the MFN (e.g., Boksem and De Cremer, 2010; Hewig et al., 2011).
However, though results show that differences in MFN amplitude
are related to concerns for fairness and rejection rate (Boksem and
De Cremer, 2010; Hewig et al., 2011), it is unclear to what extent
MFN amplitude differences between fair and unfair offers are
affected by the proposer himself as a reference agent, or whether
the MFN just differentiates between high and low amounts of
money.
Findings of a recent study support the notion that the pro-
poser accounts for alterations in the MFN. As outlined earlier
one would expect a negative-going MFN after receiving an unfair
offer. In their study they could show that social closeness between
the proposer and the responder alters the polarity of the MFN
amplitude. Offers made by a friend caused an inversion of the
MFN (Campanha et al., 2011). However, a recent electrophysi-
ological study investigated the influence of social comparison on
behavior in the UG and MFN amplitudes by adding a social ref-
erence point, i.e., average proposals in other proposer-responder
dyads were also presented to the responders (Wu et al., 2011);
yet, no influence on the MFN amplitude could be reported. In
a previous study, we added a human agent as a reference point
by employing a three-person UG (Alexopoulos et al., 2012). This
third player, a dummy-player so to speak, had no bearing in the
game itself. Money had to be split up between all three play-
ers, and the responder, whose EEG was recorded during the
game, had to accept or reject the allocation as otherwise cus-
tomary in the standard UG. Results, as indicated by the MFN
amplitudes, showed that responders only differentiated between
fair and unfair offers toward themselves disregarding the share
assigned to the dummy-player. However, offers that denoted a
low share for the responder and a high share for the dummy-
player elicited more pronouncedMFN amplitudes than did offers
with a low share for both players. This dissociation between the
two kinds of unfair offers toward the responder might indicate
that the third person had an impact on the responders’ MFNs,
and that he/she acts as the relevant reference agent responders
care about. But though several studies suggested that empathic
concerns are reflected in the MFN, the MFN observed in the
responders seemed to be associated with negative social prefer-
ences. Nevertheless, it must be considered that participants were
usually acquainted with each other whereas, in our study the
dummy-players were unacquainted and in fact their presence was
simulated. Therefore, one could assume that the actual presence
of the dummy-player could have changed the direction of social
preferences.
In the current study we therefore changed the setting and
recorded EEG simultaneously from both recipients—the respon-
der and the dummy-player—while they were playing the three-
person UG using the same setting as reported in Alexopoulos
et al. (2012). In doing so, we are able to clarify how the outcomes
of the respective other are evaluated by participants who were
treated fairly or unfairly themselves and to what extent agency
influences concerns for fairness. Furthermore, we supposed that
the actual presence of the third player changes the pattern of
MFN amplitudes. Since several studies have shown that pre-play
communication facilitates cooperation in social dilemma or bar-
gaining games, respectively [for a survey see Crawford (1998)],
we expected a similar effect on the early neural processes. More
precisely, we expected a more negative MFN difference wave
for unfair compared to fair offers assigned to the third player
and an interaction of unfairness toward oneself with unfairness
toward the other for unsubtracted, non-difference, ERP ampli-
tudes. However the EEG of the dummy-player was recorded for
two further reasons: First, we wanted them to be in the very same
situation. Recording only the EEG of the responder could give rise
to the feeling of being disadvantaged from the outset. Second,
given that the dummy-players had no impact on the game, i.e.,
they could not punish unfair treatment, they acted as a yoked
control group to clarify the impact of agency.
In addition to the ERP data individual concerns for fairness
were collected, as previous studies reported that fairness con-
cerns are related to MFN amplitude differences (Boksem and
De Cremer, 2010). To this end we applied a justice sensitivity
scale (Schmitt et al., 2004, 2010), which measures the degree to
which individuals are concerned about injustice toward oneself
and others.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-six undergraduate students (16 males; mean age= 23.3±
2.69 years) from the University of Vienna participated in the
experiment. All subjects were healthy, right handed, and naïve
to the paradigm applied. Handedness was assessed using the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Subjects were
paid between 15 and 20 Euros on average; actual earnings
depended on their performance in the game.
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki (1973, revised in 1983) and local guidelines and regu-
lations of the University of Vienna and the Faculty of Psychology.
Written informed consent was obtained prior to the experiment.
JUSTICE SENSITIVITY
Individual differences in the perception of justice were mea-
sured using the Justice Sensitivity Inventory (Schmitt et al., 2004,
2010). This 40-item questionnaire encompasses justice sensitiv-
ity from four different perspectives: the victim, the observer,
the perpetrator, and the beneficiary. Each of the four subscales
is covered by 10 questions that participants have to answer
on a six-point Likert scale ranging from 0 to 5. Correlations
between socially desirable and undesirable traits (Schmitt et al.,
2004) as well as results from social bargaining games sug-
gest that observer and beneficiary sensitivity reflect the degree
to which a person is concerned about injustice toward others
(Fetchenhauer and Huang, 2004). High scores on the domain
victim sensitivity reflect concerns for justice toward oneself
and are related to rather selfish behavior (Gollwitzer et al.,
2009).
STIMULUS MATERIAL
Altogether 324 proposals representing different divisions of the
amount of 12, 15, or 18 Euros between the three players were
presented. Half of these proposals were generated by the com-
puter; the other half was provided by human proposers collected
pre-experimentally [for details see Alexopoulos et al. (2012)]. In
each of the two conditions (computer/human proposer) subjects
received 27 fair offers (1/3 of the total amount for each player,
hereinafter referred to as fair/fair offers) and 27 offers with an
unfair share (less than 15%) for both receivers (referred to as
unfair/unfair offers). 54 offers with an unfair share for one player
only (receiving less than 15%, whereas the other one received
1/3), half of them with an unfair share for the responder (referred
to as unfair/fair) and the other half with an unfair share for the
dummy-player (referred to as fair/unfair). In addition, 54 offers
were presented that did not meet any of the previous criteria and
were therefore excluded from further analysis. In all conditions,
the proposers allocated at least one-third of the total amount to
themselves (see Figure 1 for examples of the different categories).
In accordance with our previous study (Alexopoulos et al.,
2012) the presentation of these proposals, written in German
(light gray background, black font color), consisted of three lines:
the first line contained the amount the proposer (e.g., “John gets
4C”) or the computer (e.g., “The computer gets 4C”) wanted
to keep, the second indicated the amount the responder, i.e.,
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the three-person UG. Structure of a single trial (for detailed description, see text) and the four conditions each with
an exemplary allocation.
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the participant, would receive (e.g., “Player 1 gets 4C”), and
the third line indicated the amount the third player would get
(e.g., “Player 2 gets 4C”). Offers were presented in six blocks
with rest periods of varying duration in between. During these
breaks both players were presented with the photographs of
the proposers of the subsequent trials. Stimulus presentation
was controlled by a Pentium IV 3.00GHz computer using E-
prime software (E-prime 2.0, Psychology Software Tools, Inc.,
Sharpsburg, Maryland).
PARADIGM AND PROCEDURE
Participants were invited in gender-matched pairs. Upon arrival
we ensured that these pairs were not acquainted with one another
in any way. This was a precondition for the experiment to take
place. Then they were informed about the further procedure,
received written instructions concerning the nature of the three-
person UG and were prepared for EEG recordings. Participants
were allowed to introduce themselves to each other; however con-
versation was restricted to things unrelated to the experiment. In
order to increase the feasibility of this setup and to emphasize
that half of the proposals were made by human agents, both were
shown the completed questionnaires of the proposers and were
informed that they themselves, as well as the other players, would
receive the amount of money they earned on four randomly cho-
sen trials in their respective roles in this game. The roles (i.e.,
dummy-player or responder) were randomly assigned.
Throughout the experiment, the two sat opposite each other
without eye contact in a sound-attenuated and dimly lit room.
Both participants were seated in front of a 19-inch cathode ray
tube monitor and were about 1.2m apart from each other.
Each block of trials started with the introduction of the pro-
posers, followed by 54 offers which had to be accepted or rejected
by the subjects in the role of the responder (Figure 1). Trials
were pseudo-randomized, hence each block contained the same
number of human and computer offers. Offers were presented
for 4000ms followed by two squares apparent below the offer,
each either containing the word “accept” or “reject.” These two
alternatives changed their position randomly among the trials.
Responders were instructed to press the corresponding button of
a response pad (PST Serial Response Box by Psychology Software
Tools, Inc.) with their right hand to indicate the chosen alterna-
tive. Subsequently feedbackwas given for the duration of 2000ms.
The format of the feedback was similar to the offer and indicated
the actual allocation. Trials were separated by a variable inter-
trial interval with a duration of 2300–2700ms during which a
black fixation cross was presented. At the end of each block, par-
ticipants were informed about the amount of money they had
gained so far followed by the introduction of the subsequent pro-
posers. To maintain the attention of the other participant, i.e., the
third player, 12 randomly chosen trials were followed by ques-
tions concerning the current offer (e.g.: Was the proposer male
or female?). Below these questions two squares appeared, each of
which either contained the word “yes” or “no” and subjects in
the role of the third player had to press the corresponding button
to answer. Subjects knew that for every correct answer both will
receive 0.50 Euros additionally to the outcome of four randomly
chosen trials.
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL RECORDINGS
EEG data from both subjects were recorded via 61 Ag/AgCl
equidistantly located scalp electrodes embedded in an elastic
cap (EASYCAP GmbH, Herrsching, Germany; montage M10),
referenced to non-cephalic balanced sterno-vertebral electrodes
(Stephenson and Gibbs, 1951). For eye movement artifact correc-
tion, vertical and horizontal electro-oculograms (VEOG, HEOG)
were recorded bipolarly from above and below the left eye
(VEOG), and from right and left outer canthi (HEOG). The
subjects’ skin was slightly scratched with a sterile needle at all
recording sites in order to minimize skin potential artifacts and
to ascertain homogeneous electrode impedances below 2 k.
Simultaneously recorded signals were amplified using two sep-
arate DC-amplifiers with high baseline stability and an input
impedance of 100G (Ing. Kurt Zickler GmbH, Pfaffstätten,
Austria). Signals were digitized with a 1 kHz sampling rate and
recorded within a frequency range from DC (0Hz) to 250Hz.
Synchronization of data collection was achieved using an external
signal generator synchronizing the two DC-amplifiers.
DATA PREPROCESSING
Eye movement and blink artifacts were first eliminated using a
linear regression approach on the basis of parameters obtained
in pre-experimental calibration trials (Bauer and Lauber, 1979).
Using a template matching procedure blink coefficients were
identified. Blink correction was then performed by subtract-
ing vertical and horizontal EOG signals weighted this way from
each EEG channel. Epochs of 1000ms, 800ms following stimulus
(offer) onset and 200ms preceding the onset, were extracted for
the conditions fair/fair, unfair/unfair, fair/unfair, and unfair/fair
(see Figure 1). For further data processing EEGLAB 6.03b was
used (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). The 800ms epochs were
aligned to the 200ms baseline preceding the presentation of the
offer. Subsequently, data were down-sampled to 250 smp/s, low
pass filtered (6 dB/octave slope) at 30Hz cutoff, and linear trends
were removed. To further improve data quality, e.g., correct-
ing for artifacts occurring repeatedly, we followed the approach
suggested by Delorme et al. (2007) which we already used and
described in detail in Alexopoulos et al. (2012). According to
Marco-Pallares and colleagues (2011), 10–20 trials are enough
for measuring a reliable component, thus, subjects with less than
15 trials were excluded from further analysis. Thus, two pairs
of subjects had to be excluded from further analysis since the
remaining number of trials after artifact correction was too low.
The remaining participants had on average 22.56 (SD = 2.2) tri-
als per condition remained for each of the responders and 21.17
(2.3) for the dummy-players.
DATA ANALYSIS
Based on visual inspection of grand-averaged waveforms, scalp
potential topography of difference waves, and in accordance with
previous literature, the MFN was quantified as the average base-
line corrected mean amplitude value in the time range between
220 and 320ms after stimulus onset at electrode Fcz, Cz, and Pz
(Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Boksem et al., 2012). Though statis-
tical analyses revealed similar results for all electrodes; reported
results are based on Cz since this electrode gave the highest effect
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sizes. Amplitude values of the MFN for the condition human and
computer were submitted to 2× 2 repeated measures ANOVAs
with the factors Self (levels: fair and unfair share for oneself) and
Other (levels: fair and unfair share for the other player) separately
for both groups of subjects (responders and dummy-players). All
factors were defined as within-subject factors.
Furthermore, to reduce confounding effects of other ERP
components on the amplitude of the MFN and to scrutinize
potential differences in processing of the outcome for the other
recipient, we created difference waves. These difference waves
were constructed by subtracting ERPs following fair offers from
unfair offers toward the respective other, while the level of fair-
ness toward oneself was kept constant. In this way we obtained
two difference waves for each player: (1) Self fair, Other unfair
minus fair, and (2) Self unfair, Other unfair minus fair. To test
whether difference waves were statistically different from zero a
one-sample t-test was applied.
To assess the relation between early neuronal processes and
individual differences in justice sensitivity, MFN amplitudes,
respectively the associated difference waves (unfair minus fair) at
channel Cz were correlated with justice sensitivity scores (using
Pearson correlation and two-tailed significance levels). Due to the
low variability in acceptance rates we refrained from correlation
analyzes of MFN amplitudes and decision behavior. For all anal-
yses the significance threshold was set to p = 0.05. All statistical
analyses were carried out with IBM SPSS Statistics 19 software
(IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA).
RESULTS
PERFORMANCE
On average responders accepted 53% (SD = 43.15) of the offers
made by the computer, compared to 52% (SD = 43.35) of offers
made by human proposers. There was a statistically significant
difference in acceptance rates depending on which type of offer
was received, χ2(3) = 34.193, P = 0.000. Post-hoc analysis with
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests was conducted with Bonferroni cor-
rection applied, resulting in a significance level set at p < 0.008.
Rejection rates were significantly higher for inequitable offers
compared to equitable offers (for all comparisons p < 0.001).
Offers with an unfair share for both players were rejected signif-
icantly more often than those which represented an unfair share
to the dummy-player only (for details see Table 1).
ERP DATA
Responders
For the responders, mean MFN amplitudes in the time window
220–280ms after a proposal made by a human agent revealed
Table 1 | Median (interquartile range) acceptance rates for human and
computer proposers.
Human Computer
Fair (R)/Fair (D) 100% (96–100) 100% (96–100)
Unfair (R)/Unfair (D) 0% (0–7) 2% (0–7)
Unfair (R)/Fair (D) 33% (0–75) 29% (0–65)
Fair (R)/Unfair (D) 52% (24–97) 67% (24–97)
no significant main effect for the factor Self, [F(1, 15) = 1.394,
p = 0.256, partial η2 = 0.085] and the factor Other [F(1, 15) =
1.396, p = 0.256, partial η2 = 0.085]. However, the interaction
(Self × Other) was statistically significant [F(1, 15) = 19.170, p =
0.001, partial η2 = 0.561]. Grand-average waveforms depicted in
Figure 2 clearly show an increased MFN following offers with
a low share for both recipients (unfair/unfair). Further analyses
revealed that MFN amplitudes following this kind of offers were
statistically significant compared to all other possible offers (for
all p < 0.04). Likewise, only in cases where the responder received
an unfair share, the amplitudes of difference waves (unfair/unfair
minus unfair/fair) were significantly different from zero (mean
= −2.352μV, t(15) = −4.452, p = 0.000) (see Figure 3). In case
the responder received a fair share, however, no effect for high and
low offers assigned to the dummy-player could be found (mean
= 1.152μV, t(15) = 1.544, p = 0.144). The correlation analyzes
of MFN difference waves and individual differences in justice
sensitivity revealed a statistical relationship given by perpetrator
sensitivity being negatively related to MFN amplitudes following
proposals comprising unfair amounts toward the dummy-player
(r = −0.553, p = 0.033). Thus, responders who are concerned
about injustice toward others exhibit larger, more negative going,
MFN amplitudes following advantageous inequality (see Figure 4
and Table 2).
Dummy-player
Analysis of the mean MFN amplitudes for the dummy-players
revealed a marginal non-significant interaction effect for Self ×
Other, [F(1, 15) = 4.301, p = 0.056, partial η2 = 0.223]. The factor
Self [F(1, 15) = 0.001, p = 0.970, partial η2 = 0.000] and factor
Other [F(1, 15) = 3.507, p = 0.081, partial η2 = 0.189] again did
not reach significance. Grand-averaged waveforms (see Figure 2)
of the dummy-players indicate that compared to all other possi-
ble offers, those offers with a low share for only the responders
(unfair/fair) are associated with a diminished negative going com-
ponent. Consequently, only in case the dummy-player received
a fair share, statistically significant differences between unfair
and fair offers toward the responder could be observed [mean
= 1.846, t(15) = 3.672, p = 0.002]. In case the dummy-player
received an unfair amount, no difference in MFN amplitudes
associated with unfair compared to fair offer toward the respon-
der could be observed [mean = −0.091μV, t(15) = −0.116, p =
0.909]. The relation between justice sensitivity and MFN differ-
ence wave was analyzed similar to the responders’ data. Victim
sensitivity was positively related to MFN difference waves follow-
ing offers with an unfair share for the responder, regardless of
whether the dummy-player received a fair share (r = 0.591, p =
0.008) or an unfair share (r = 0.458, p = 0.037; see Figure 4 and
Table 2). Accordingly, dummy-players who were more concerned
about injustice toward themselves exhibited larger positive going
MFN amplitudes following unfair offers for the responder.
None of the statistical analyses applied to the ERP data associ-
ated with proposalsmade by the computer reached significance—
neither for the responders (p > 0.242) nor for the dummy—
players (p > 0.328). Furthermore, we found no differences
between the responders and the dummy-players with regard to
justice sensitivity (p > 0.296 for all four scales).
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FIGURE 2 | Grand average ERP waveforms for each recipient and
proposer at Cz for the offers: fair (R)/fair (D) (blue line), unfair
(R)/unfair (D) (red line), unfair (R)/fair (D) (black line), or fair
(R)/unfair (D) (green line); format: responder/dummy-player.
Negative is plotted up; Zeros on the timeline indicate the onset of
the offer.
FIGURE 3 | Scalp potential topography of the average voltage
differences between fair and unfair offers for the responder for the
time point of the MFN (220–320ms following offer onset).
DISCUSSION
In the current study in contrast to previous studies two par-
ticipants were recorded simultaneously while playing the three-
person UG. Both participants played the part of the receivers
with one of them in the role of the dummy-player having
no say. The responder, on the other side, had veto power
and thus, was able to harm the payoff of all other play-
ers. These differences in power became apparent already about
250ms after the onset of the different offers. For both partic-
ipants a difference in MFN amplitude depending on the share
assigned to the respective other can be reported. In line with
previous literature, MFN amplitudes elicited by unfair offers
were more negative going than those elicited by fair offers,
but this only applied for the responders. The dummy-players
showed to some extend the opposite pattern; unfair offers com-
pared to fair offers toward the responder were followed by
positive-going amplitudes within the time range of the MFN.
Although, we found differences between MFN amplitudes when
the offer is made by a human proposer, no difference in MFN
amplitudes could be observed following proposals made by the
computer, neither for the responder nor for the dummy-player.
This might be surprising at first since acceptance rates did not
differ substantially between these two conditions. However, con-
sidering that we have to differentiate between at least two different
processes this might become more comprehensible. The MFN
is associated with the subjective value assigned to a certain sit-
uation (Holroyd and Coles, 2008; Rigoni et al., 2010); whereas,
value is derived by comparative processes. Thus, expectations or
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FIGURE 4 | Correlation between justice sensitivity scores and the
difference in MFN amplitude between fair and unfair offers toward
the respective other each with fair shares for oneself. (A) MFN
difference wave for fair and unfair offers toward the dummy-player [fair
(R)/unfair (D) – fair (R)/fair (D)] and perpetrator sensitivity of the
responders (B) MFN difference wave for fair and unfair offers toward
the responder [unfair (R)/fair (D) – unfair (R)/fair (D)] and victim
sensitivity of the dummy-player.
Table 2 | Correlation between justice sensitivity and MFN difference wave.
Responder Dummy-player
Fair (R)/Unfair (D) –
Fair (R)/Fair (D)
Unfair (R)/Unfair (D) –
Unfair (R)/Fair (D)
Unfair (R)/Fair (D) –
Fair (R)/Fair (D)
Unfair (R)/Unfair –
Fair (R)/Unfair (D)
Victim −0.088 −0.259 0.591** 0.458*
Observer −0.229 −0.048 0.374 0.033
Perpetrator −0.553* −0.001 0.086 −0.036
Beneficiary −0.356 −0.325 −0.211 0.177
Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
prior experience and available options change the absolute value
of a given reward and the associated MFN amplitude. Several
studies have shown that social processes are also reflected in the
amplitude of the MFN [for a review see Thoma and Bellebaum
(2012)], since experiences in social interactions drive the expec-
tations we have regarding the behavior of other individuals.
Therefore, it might not be too surprising that no substantial
differences in the MFN amplitude can be observed between con-
ditions when the computer acts as a proposer, especially since
offers are randomized and, regarding the offer size, evenly dis-
tributed. This might suggest that the intentions of the proposers
indeed influence the initial evaluation process, however do not
necessarily determine whether an unequal offer is accepted or
not. After all it is still not a pure computer condition, since the
dummy-player still has to be considered in the current deci-
sion process. Similar results were obtained in a study in which
a random number generator decided how to split the money
between two players. This study was also able to show that the
ACC and the medial prefrontal cortex, both regions that have
been associated with the MFN component especially in the con-
text of the UG (Campanha et al., 2011; Billeke et al., 2012),
are involved in the processing of unequal offers only when the
participants themselves were affected. Moreover, no activation
increase could be observed in this cluster when decisions were
made for someone else without the participant being directly
affected, although unequal offers were still rejected (Civai et al.,
2012).
Regarding the results of responders; a recent attempt to inves-
tigate MFN amplitude changes in the context of the three-person
UG found that responders did not differentiate between fair
and unfair offers assigned to the dummy-player (Alexopoulos
et al., 2012). Nevertheless, offers that clearly favored the dummy-
player opposed to the subjects themselves were followed by the
most pronounced MFN amplitudes. In contrast, offers that were
equally unfair for both—the dummy-player and the responder—
did not reveal distinct MFN amplitudes. Being speculative, anger
toward the proposer and envy toward the dummy-player may
have led to the increase in amplitude. In contrast to the present
study these two recipients were anonymous to each other. We
assume that the change in experimental setup has led to the
observed differences in the ERP patterns of the responders. In
the present study offers with an equally low share for the two
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recipients elicited the most pronounced, negative going, ampli-
tude at the time a MFN is usually observed. This suggests that
offers comprising a fair share for at least one of the two recipients
are evaluated nearly as satisfying as offers with an equally high
share for all three players. Furthermore, responders clearly dif-
ferentiated between high and low offers assigned to the dummy-
player, with low offers leading to a more negative going MFN, at
least when they themselves received an unfair share as well.
It is well known that pre-play communication enforces coop-
eration in social dilemma games or bargaining games, respectively
[for a survey see Crawford (1998) or Greiner et al. (2005)] inves-
tigating pre-play communication in the three-person UG. In
line with this finding there are at least two explanations for the
changes in MFN amplitudes: Strategic issues, since the reputation
of the responder is at risk, or changes in utility, since group iden-
tity enhances “we” feelings among group members, commonly
summarized as emphatic concerns (Greiner et al., 2010). Recent
efforts in the field of social neuroscience provide evidence that
empathy is modulated by perceived group membership (Hein
et al., 2010) and that empathy-related processes are expressed in
the appearance of the MFN. Receiving negative feedback is asso-
ciated with an increase in MFN amplitude. Observing someone
else receiving negative feedback similarly elicits a MFN. Whereas,
the magnitude depends on the perceived similarity with the other
(Carp et al., 2009), the closeness (Kang et al., 2010), self-reported
levels of empathy (Fukushima and Hiraki, 2009), and the degree
to which participants include others in their self-concept (Kang
et al., 2010). Since the MFN is supposed to be generated in the
ACC, the fact that the ACC is a key structure implicated in the
empathic response to physical and social pain of others (Singer
et al., 2004; Masten et al., 2011), further suggests that empathic
concerns over strategic issues have influenced the appearance of
the MFN. This view is further supported by the relation between
justice sensitivity and MFN amplitudes found in the present
study.
Even though MFN amplitudes did not differentiate between
high and low offers assigned to the dummy-player in cases
were responders received a high share, the mean amplitude of
MFN difference waves varied with the degree to which sub-
jects reported to be concerned about injustice toward oth-
ers. Boksem and De Cremer (2010) already reported that MFN
amplitudes following unfair offers in the standard UG varied with
self-reported concerns for fairness and honesty.
In the present study the degree to which responders included
the share for the dummy-player when they themselves received
a fair share in the evaluation process, similarly varied with their
concerns for fairness. Responders scoring high on perpetrator
sensitivity exhibited larger MFN amplitudes following advanta-
geously unequal offers. Perpetrator sensitivity is highly related to
socially desirable traits as well as to cooperative behavior in social
dilemma games (Schmitt et al., 2004; Gollwitzer et al., 2005).
Since perpetrator sensitivity focuses on situations where people
actively take advantage of another party, it is assumed to be linked
to feelings of guilt (Thomas et al., 2010). For instance, one exam-
ple for perpetrator sensitivity would be “I feel guilty when I am
better off than others for no reason.” Hence, this kind of dis-
comfort might be reflected in higher, more negative-going, MFN
amplitudes in response to unfair offers toward the dummy-player.
In other words, feelings of guilt might reduce the value of the
relatively high share assigned to the responder in the light of a
low, unfair share toward the dummy-players.
Regarding the results of the dummy-players; also MFN ampli-
tudes of the participants playing in the role of the dummy-player
were related to justice sensitivity, though, a somewhat different
picture is emerging. First of all, the dummies’ MFN amplitudes,
though differing with respect to the outcome of the responder,
were more pronounced for fair than unfair offers toward the
responder. This is in contrast to what one would expect consider-
ing the data of the responders. Nevertheless, Marco-Pallares and
colleagues (2010) showed that in a competitive setting observing
someone else receiving a gain led to higher, more negative-going
MFN amplitudes, whereas in neutral conditions MFN amplitudes
were higher following losses as compared to gains of the per-
former. Second, offers with low shares for the responder and high
shares for the dummy-player elicited a MFN difference wave sig-
nificantly different from zero, but again with positive polarity.
Furthermore, the higher the scores of the dummy-players were
on the victim sensitivity scale, the more positive amplitudes fol-
lowing low offers for the responders could be observed. Victim
sensitivity covers situations associated with injustice toward one-
self and is related to socially undesirable traits like vengeance,
jealousy and distrust. In bargaining games victim sensitive indi-
viduals tend to be less cooperative, i.e., they offer less in the UG
or dictator game (Gollwitzer et al., 2005). The dummy-players
are at a disadvantage from the outset, because they have no
influence on the proposed allocation. This might have led to
the finding that advantageous, unequal offers are more favor-
able than any other possible offer and even more so in subjects
who are generally more concerned about fairness toward them-
selves. In contrast to our previous study where the responders
reacted merely selfish, the presence of the dummy-player seemed
to enforce “we” feelings and empathic concerns. However, this
time likewise the responders in the anonymous setting, the pow-
erless players experienced negative social preferences. While there
are parallels between those two, there are also substantial differ-
ences: Responders in the anonymous setting preferred all other
offers over those that assigned a low share to themselves and
a high share toward the other. Therefore, we assume that envy
might play a crucial role. In contrast, the powerless players pre-
ferred offers with low shares toward the responder and high shares
toward themselves, which might be more closely related to spite.
However, there is another possible explanation regarding the
MFN of the dummy-players: It is assumed that the MFN distin-
guishes events on an abstract good-bad dimension (Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2004a) or in other words indicates whether a goal has
been achieved or not (Hajcak et al., 2006). This is achieved by
taking into account prior knowledge or available alternatives to
adapt to a changing environment and facilitate future behav-
ior. Positive and negative reward prediction errors determine the
amplitude of the MFN, unpredicted positive events decrease the
amplitude and negative events increase the amplitude. In light
of the assumptions concerning the appearance of the MFN this
might suggest that in the social context rather the expectations
regarding other people’s behavior and not merely reward and
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punishment itself influence the amplitude of the MFN. Thus, one
can argue that dummy-players might have anticipated receiving
lower offers than the responders, therefore high offers for the
dummy-player were an unexpected reward leading to a reduction
in MFN amplitude.
To conclude, in the present study we showed that the influence
of agency and physical distance on social preferences can already
be observed at an early level of neural processing. As participants
were unfamiliar to each other prior to the experiment and we
did not control for sympathy, future research has to show how
the level of familiarity or sympathy will further enforce this “we”
feelings.
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